Naval Strategy Mishaps and Misguided Insights: Century-Old Wars' Fallacious Impact on Navies, Culminating in Continued Blunders

In the world of international politics, the notion that competition often leads to conflict, particularly when it comes to naval power, is a common sentiment. This is particularly true in the context of the current great power competition, primarily with China.

China, with its strategic moves, has positioned itself as a formidable naval power. It has built a series of small naval bases on man-made islands off its mainland coast, a clear indication of its ambitions to challenge US dominance at sea. This assertion is further bolstered by China's possession of an aircraft carrier, first launched in 2011.

The United States, on the other hand, has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over sovereignty concerns. This decision, however, presents a challenge in navigating the complexities of modern naval strategy, especially when dealing with a peer competitor like China.

The US Navy's approach, rooted in the Mahanian theory, has been a subject of debate. According to Alfred Thayer Mahan, a decisive battle at sea between great powers would be won by eliminating an enemy fleet with capital ships, thus securing command of the sea and, consequently, the war. However, the supposedly decisive naval battle of World War I at Jutland, and the Soviet navy's substantial force of nuclear submarines during the Cold War, have shown that this theory may not always hold true.

The US Navy's focus on capital ships, particularly aircraft carriers, overlooks the lessons learned from smaller antisubmarine forces that won in the Atlantic during World War II. A more flexible naval force, increased trade alliances, and adherence to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are key to a modern naval strategy to combat China.

Meanwhile, China is building its navy for offensive operations in the spirit of Mahan, posing a direct threat to the US's primary naval strike power. China fears isolation and its own lack of access to trade and shipping routes, making its naval expansion a strategic response to these concerns.

The US strategy is using its naval power to enforce an international treaty it has not even signed, raising questions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of this approach. The US Navy continues to rely on outdated Mahanian theory despite having the ability and capability to update, modernize, and strategize for the modern era.

The nation that supports the National War College in the series "Compete and Win: Envisioning a Competitive Strategy for the Twenty-First Century" is the United States. The purpose of this support is to develop a competitive strategy for the 21st century, one that takes into account the evolving landscape of great power competition and the need for naval strategies that are adaptable, effective, and grounded in the realities of the modern world.

Naval Strategy Mishaps and Misguided Insights: Century-Old Wars' Fallacious Impact on Navies, Culminating in Continued Blunders