Probing for Challenges: The Preconceived Notions of JADC2 Integration
The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept, a visionary plan to link all US military sensors to all shooters and weapons platforms, has been met with both excitement and scepticism. The goal is to empower decisive victory in a future multi-domain conflict, but questions remain about its effectiveness and resilience in combat.
The Ukrainian conflict has provided a stark reminder of the challenges that a highly centralized and secretive organization can face when executing complex operations. Both Russia's hubris and miscalculation, as well as its inability to recover quickly after its plan failed, have been exposed. Similarly, a hack on Viasat, a company providing internet service to people across Europe, crippled Ukrainian military communications just prior to Russia's invasion, highlighting the risks of a single, centralized data and information system.
Modern conflict demands resilient and reliable communications, and JADC2's proposals do not seem to seriously consider the security and resiliency risks inherent to a centralized system. There is concern that JADC2's drawbacks could make the system more of a liability than an advantage, especially if US military doctrine and strategic planning do not evolve in parallel with the technology's employment.
Retired Admiral James Stavridis cautions that over-reliance on new technologies like JADC2 can create potential Achilles' heels. The character of warfare will continue to be changed by technology, and some elements of JADC2 are worthy goals, but it is important to ask tough questions about its potential.
Not everyone is pessimistic about JADC2. The Pentagon has published a "Summary of the JADC2 Strategy", and Captain Maggie Smith, a US Army cyber officer currently assigned to the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy, is conducting research into the concept. The series "Compete and Win: Envisioning a Competitive Strategy for the Twenty-First Century", a joint initiative by the Army Cyber Institute and an unnamed website, is also exploring the role of JADC2 in US national security.
However, the technological sophistication and prowess of the US military are not currently in question, and we should be asking if the resources flowing toward JADC2 could be more advantageously focused elsewhere. The Army has struggled to deliver on the intended purpose of exoskeleton technology, which is meant to improve a soldier's performance and safety on the battlefield.
Emphasis should be placed on alternative or complementary initiatives and technologies to improve command and control, bolster security, and establish information resiliency to mitigate the risks of miscalculating JADC2's potential. Being faster and more skillful than China and Russia is crucial for national security, and to compete with them requires a US military that can innovate and evolve to maintain strategic and tactical advantage.
In the past, overly sophisticated and sensitive technology has been a hindrance in combat scenarios, and the same could potentially apply to JADC2. During Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Russian communications systems have exhibited a high failure rate, leaving troops to rely on insecure but trusted platforms to communicate. This serves as a reminder that simplicity and reliability can often be more important than complexity and sophistication in the heat of battle.
In conclusion, JADC2 presents a promising concept, but it is crucial to approach it with a critical eye. The potential benefits must be weighed against the risks, and alternative solutions should be considered to ensure the US military remains resilient, adaptable, and prepared for any future conflict.
